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Abstract: Teacher absenteeism in government primary schools in rural India is a huge and well-documented 
phenomenon. Using Christopher Hood’s cultural-theory framework of doing public management, this paper analyses this 
problem from four different perspectives, i.e. the hierarchist, egalitarian, individualist and fatalist management approach. 
The paper proceeds with a discussion of three innovative strategies currently proposed or pursued in India to deal with 
teacher absenteeism. These are 1) the creation of local-level institutions that could hold teachers accountable, 2) the 
creation of a voucher system to allow parents to choose the school (government or private) for their children, and 3) the 
recruitment of volunteers on contract basis to do a teaching job. These three strategies, the paper argues, can be interpreted 
as responses that fit, respectively, within an egalitarian, an individualist and a fatalist approach. The paper concludes that 
none of the four perspectives can be expected to provide ‘quick fix’ solutions, especially because they ‘act on’ teachers 
rather than ‘act with’ them. Teachers, it is argued, should get a larger role themselves in the formulation and 
implementation of a strategy to address teacher absenteeism. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 More and more children go to primary schools
1
 in rural 
India. Since the late 1980s, and especially since the mid-
1990s, enrolment rates have gone up considerably. On the 
one hand, parents have become more and more convinced of 
the value of education. On the other hand, there have been 
some major governmental efforts to bring all children to 
school, notably the District Primary Education Programme 
(DPEP) and the ‘Education for All campaign’ also known as 
Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA). By 2003-04, more than 94 
per cent of the estimated 210 million children in the age 
group of 6-14 years were reported to be enrolled in schools 
(MHRD GoI, 2006) [1]. The large majority of these children 
go to government schools, though the importance of private 
fee-charging schools is rapidly increasing. Almost all the so-
called ‘first generation learners’ access government schools. 
The closing of the educational gap, hence, depends to a large 
extent on the quality of education in these schools. 
 Unfortunately, there are major problems with rural 
government primary schools in the country. A recent 
nationwide survey in rural India found that overall, 40 per 
cent of students studying in class five in government schools 
could not read a class two text and 58 percent could not 
solve simple division sums (Pratham 2006) [2]. Children 
may, hence, complete primary schooling without having 
acquired the expected literacy and numeracy skills. 
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1In most Indian States, primary schooling is from classes one to five; the 
elementary cycle is from class one to eight. Typically, in rural areas the 
entry age into class one is around 6 years. 
 One of the problems, and the main focus of this paper, is 
teacher absenteeism. As has been reported in many studies, 
there is a problem with (unauthorized) teacher absenteeism 
in many parts of the country (Mehrotra 2006) [3] (PROBE 
Team 1999) [4]. The most recent authoritative study on 
teacher absenteeism in the country is the World Bank 
National Absence Survey (WBNAS). Making unannounced 
multiple visits to 3700 government primary schools across 
20 States within India, 35,000 observations on teacher 
attendance were collected. Overall, 25.2 per cent or roughly 
one in four teachers were found to be absent in rural areas.
2
 
Official non-academic duties accounted for only four per 
cent of the total absences and ten per cent of absences were 
on account of officially sanctioned leaves.
3
 The PROBE 
restudy conducted in 2006 found that in the course of ten 
years many things had improved (i.e. enrolment, school 
infrastructure, school incentives, school meals etc.) but 
classroom activity had not (Shiva Kumar 2009) [6]. 
 In an attempt to explain the high level of unauthorized 
teacher absenteeism, several scholars have emphasised the 
lack of motivation on the part of the teachers. This has been 
ascribed to overcrowded classrooms, poor infrastructural 
facilities, unfilled vacancies, burden of non-academic tasks, 
lack of adequate training to deal with multi-lingual and 
multi-ability classes, declining social status of the teaching 
profession and increasing social class differences between 
teachers and the clientele of government schools. Other 
reasons have to do with the institutional context: lack of 
                                                
2Significant inter-State variations were found in this study (Kremer 2005) 
[5]. The absence rate varied from 14.6 per cent in Maharashtra (the lowest) 
to 41.9 per cent in Jharkhand (the highest). 
3Pratham (2006) [2] also found a similar teacher absence rate of 25 per cent 
in rural areas in the whole of India. 
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accountability and the absence of incentives for teachers to 
work well.
4
 
 What can be done about teacher absenteeism? Since our 
focus is on teachers in government schools, teacher 
absenteeism is a public management problem. What is it that 
those who manage government school teachers can do to 
reduce teacher absenteeism? In this paper, we discuss the 
various public management responses that can be developed 
to deal with the problem. In this discussion, we use 
Christopher Hood’s cultural-theory framework of doing 
public management. Based on the work of Mary Douglas, 
this framework distinguishes four different approaches of 
doing public management. In the next section we will 
describe these approaches. In the third section we will apply 
them to the problem of teacher absenteeism in India. We will 
discuss how teacher absenteeism can be interpreted in 
different ways, and how these interpretations lead to 
different public management responses. The fourth section 
will provide a review of the literature of three solutions that 
have been advocated or tried in the Indian context. The paper 
will end with some comparative notes regarding the four 
management responses, and will conclude that what misses 
in all four is the active involvement of teachers themselves. 
HOOD’S FRAMEWORK OF PUBLIC MANAGEMENT 
STYLES 
 Hood (1998) [7] distinguishes the four following 
approaches for dealing with public management problems: 
the hierarchist, the egalitarian, the individualist and the 
fatalist approach.
5
 All these approaches are essentially about 
control and regulation, but they try to achieve this in 
different ways. Public management in the hierarchist way is 
characterized by strict relations of authority. Ideally, 
organisations have a clear hierarchical structure and a clear 
division of responsibilities. The assumption is that such 
organisations provide the best guarantee that everybody will 
do his/her job - and that slackness or shirking can be 
controlled. There is a strong belief in well-understood (not 
necessarily written down) rules and rule-like behaviour. 
When things go wrong, it is always clear who is to be 
blamed: the person(s) who did not follow the rules (Hood 
1998: 74) [7]. When managerial problems crop up, the 
normal course of action is to clarify the lines of authority and 
strengthen the role of the formal overseers. This is the 
traditional way in which public management problems have 
been tackled in many government bureaucracies, including 
the Indian one. 
 Doing public management the egalitarian way, on the 
other hand, is characterized by cooperation and participation. 
Unlike hierarchists, egalitarians believe in the desirability 
and possibility of self-organisation and self-steering 
processes. When things go wrong, egalitarians tend to see 
‘the self-serving behaviour at the top’ as the root of the 
problem (Hood 1998: 122) [7]. The egalitarian mode of 
controlling organizations is through mutuality and 
‘maximum face to face accountability’ (Hood 1998: 122) 
                                                
4See, for instance (Govinda 2005) [8] (Mooij 2008) [9] (Ramachandran 
2005) [10]. For more arguments and references, see (Narayan 2007) [11]. 
5An alternative framework for understanding organisational relationships is 
available, that is similar to Hood’s different approaches, except that the 
fatalist management style is not included. (Robinson 2000) [12]. 
[7]. Based on the subsidiarity principle, decentralized local 
self governing units are thought to be the best guarantee for 
meaningful bottom-up participatory management. 
 An individualist approach to public management is based 
on the assumption that human beings are essentially ‘rational 
egoists’ (Hood 1998: 98) [7]. In principle, they pursue their 
own interests, but the way they do this and what their 
interests are can be influenced by an institutional context 
providing incentives and disincentives for particular 
behaviour. This insight can be applied to people working 
within the government, but also to clients. The first focus 
would try to enhance performance by making people within 
the government compete for positions, money, assignments 
or prizes. A focus on clients as rational actors comes with the 
belief that there should be competitive provision of public 
services. Only when clients have choice, providers are forced 
to offer better quality, become more responsive, efficient and 
less costly. 
 In the fatalist way of doing public management, the idea 
is that there are no effective checks on the actions of public 
officials. This leads to a vicious circle: because there is no 
faith in effective checks on public office holders, no attempts 
are made to create a more stimulating environment for them. 
It is assumed that officials almost always perform poorly, are 
corrupt and since they generally do not have to account for 
their behaviour, they are able to get away with it. The result 
is widespread public cynicism about the motives and honesty 
of government officials. The expectations are low, which 
leads to a lack of interest to organise collectively for better 
checks and control (Hood 1998: 147-8) [7]. The question 
that can be raised, of course, is whether this attitude is a 
management approach at all. Indeed, as Hood (1998: 145-7) 
[7] describes, there have been many theorists who have left 
fatalism out of their discussion of management styles. Hood, 
however, maintains that although the attitude is ‘negative’, it 
is common. Many managers, he argues, believe that public 
organisation and policy are essentially unpredictable and 
chaotic processes and that responses are often more ad hoc 
than being based on a clear-cut theory - although most 
managers may express this opinion only ‘off the record’. In 
relation to our topic - teacher absenteeism in India - we think 
that this approach is quite relevant. 
MANAGEMENT STYLES AND TEACHER ABSENT-
EEISM 
 The four approaches are based on different assumptions 
about organisations and human behaviour within 
organisations. When applied to the problem of teacher 
absenteeism, they lead to different hypotheses explaining the 
problem, different lines of research and different types of 
recommendations. Indeed, we can see that reflected in the 
various interpretations of the phenomena of teacher 
absenteeism in India. See Table 1 for a summary of the four 
approaches. 
 From a hierarchist position, it would be argued that 
periodic supervision and monitoring are necessary to support 
teachers to carry out their work well and to control teacher 
absenteeism. Officially such support and inspection exists in 
government schools in India. Several studies reveal, 
however, that many schools are not inspected on a regular 
basis. There may be a shortage of supervisory staff, or 
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supervisory staff may lack the capacity to carry out proper 
supervision (Clarke and Jha 2006) [13] (Grover and Singh 
2002) [14]. Frequency of inspection was found to be 
correlated to absenteeism, confirming the view that regular 
monitoring is important (Kremer 2004) [15]. Mooij (2008) 
[9] also found that lack of serious supervision and 
appreciation from inspectors and others higher up in the 
educational bureaucracy contributed significantly to low 
levels of motivation. 
 Solutions that fall within this management style are an 
intensification of inspection. One idea that has been tried in 
rural Udaipur in Rajasthan is using cameras with tamper-
proof time and date functions. Teachers were required to 
take their snap along with students at the start and close of 
each school day. Together with other measures (a bonus in 
addition to the base salary contingent on presence, and a fine 
in case of absence), the experiment led to a decline in the 
teacher absence rate from 44 per cent to 27 per cent in a 
period of 27 months. The test scores of students also 
improved (Duflo and Banerjee 2006) [16].
6
 Mehrotra’s 
(2006) [15] suggestion of having a Teacher’s Code of 
Professional Ethics with sanctions against teachers violating 
the code also falls within this approach. 
 Comparable to hierarchists, egalitarianists also attribute 
teacher absenteeism to an accountability failure. Their 
emphasis is, however, not on accountability upwards within 
the same organisation, but on accountability outwards, viz 
towards the parents or the wider community. In India, there 
have been many studies that have observed that this 
downward/outward accountability relationship is, indeed, 
lacking in fundamental ways. Others relate this to the rise of 
private schooling and the exit (Hirschman 1970) [17] of the 
more well-to-do and educated parents from the government 
schools. (Majumdar and Mooij forthcoming) [18]. Their 
departure invariably means that government schools loose 
the kind of clientele that could monitor school quality and 
complain in case they are dissatisfied. 
 The logical solution that follows from the egalitarian 
approach is to foster and strengthen the school-community 
link through school management committees, parent-
                                                
6In 2006, this experiment was conferred the ‘ICT Digital Learning 
Innovation Award’. 
teachers associations or other local-level educational bodies. 
This strategy has been tried in many States in India and we 
will discuss it in more detail in the next section. 
 For individualists, the problem has to do with the way in 
which individual choices and behavioural patterns are 
structured or constrained. Firstly, the focus can be on 
teachers themselves and the failing incentive structure. It is 
argued that within the elementary educational system, there 
are typically no incentives for teachers to perform well 
(Ramachandran 2005) [10]. A well-defined performance 
appraisal system is virtually absent and primary school 
teachers have negligible prospects for promotion (Jha 2001) 
[19] (World Bank 1997) [20]. Promotions and increments 
depend on seniority rather than performance (Rao 2003) 
[21]. Non-monetary incentives like prizes and awards have 
been used to motivate teachers, but over the years, the 
selection of candidates has become politicized and 
independent of performance (Ramachandran 2005) [10]. All 
this means that there are virtually no sanctions in place for 
teacher absenteeism. In more than 3000 interviews with 
headmasters, only one instance was found wherein a teacher 
had been fired because of absenteeism (Kremer 2005) [5]. 
 The logical solution here would be to link the salary of 
teachers to their presence. In India, as far as we know, this 
has only been tried in the above mentioned study in rural 
Rajasthan, where, together with the help of cameras, this led 
to a considerable reduction in teacher absenteeism. Given the 
normal public service conditions and the power of teacher 
unions, it is unlikely that payment to regular teachers in 
government schools will move towards a performance-based 
salary structure. Penalizing teachers for their absence by 
withholding their allowances or even suspension is possible, 
but difficult in practice - again because teacher unions are 
strong and politically influential (Kremer 2006) [22] 
(Kingdon and Muzammil 2001) [23]. 
 Secondly, the focus can be on clients, i.e. those who seek 
education. In this case, the individualist’s solution would be 
to enhance school choice. In principle, this choice exists 
already. There is a rapidly increasing number of private fee-
charging or NGO-run schools. Many of these schools have a 
monthly fee that does not exceed the income that a daily 
wage labourer would earn in one day. They generally cater 
to the children from the lower middle classes. These so-
Table 1. Management Styles and Teachers Absenteeism 
 
Management 
Approach 
Origin of Public Management Problem Remedy Strategies to Deal with Teacher Absenteeism 
Hierarchist  
Poor compliance with rules and 
procedures; Weak system of authority to 
elicit accountability 
Tighter procedures; greater 
‘managerial’ grip 
Regular monitoring by designated supervisory 
staff; using cameras to monitor teachers; laying 
down code of ethics for teachers 
Egalitarian  
Abuse of power by higher level officials; 
insufficient participation from 
clients/users  
Empowerment and participation of 
people at the bottom  
Granting of powers to village-level 
decentralized bodies for monitoring and 
supervision 
Individualist  
Faulty incentive structures; monopoly 
provision 
Introduction of better incentives and 
disincentives to service providers; 
Introduction of competition 
Performance based pay for teachers; Vouchers 
in educational provisioning 
Fatalist  
Inherently unpredictable and chaotic 
nature of social organisation and public 
policy processes 
Ad hoc solutions; Putting parallel 
structures/devising other mechanisms 
that circumvent the core problem 
Creation of a separate para-teacher cadre 
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called Low Fee Private schools should be stimulated, 
according to the advocates of competition in education, for 
instance by introducing a voucher system (Tooley and Dixon 
2003) [24]. This would mean that parents would get an ‘x’ 
amount of money in the form of school vouchers. They 
would be allowed to use these vouchers in any school of 
their liking. Although this system has only just been piloted 
in the country and the experiences are limited, we will 
discuss the idea in greater detail below. 
 Lastly, a fatalist approach to teacher absenteeism would 
be to resort to cynicism or to decline responsibility 
altogether. Rather than assuming responsibility for the 
various problems that plague the educational sector, there is 
‘governance by resignation, privatisation by default’ (Mooij 
and Jalal 2009) [25]. The currently popular response to 
recruit para-teachers (or volunteers) could also be interpreted 
within this framework. Para-teachers are unqualified 
teachers. They generally have 10 or 12 years of schooling 
(i.e. completed secondary school) plus a few days of 
training. Their salary is often around Rs. 1000-2000 (i.e. 20-
40 euros) per month, which is much less than the monthly 
income of an average government teacher, and they are hired 
on contract basis.
7
 This is the third innovative strategy that 
will be discussed below. 
DEALING WITH TEACHER ABSENTEEISM: A 
REVIEW OF EVIDENCE 
 In this section we review the literature regarding three 
different strategies to overcome teacher absenteeism: the 
establishment of local educational committees, the 
educational voucher system and the introduction of para-
teachers. All these strategies are relatively recent. The more 
traditional way, as we have mentioned already, is by 
resorting to hierarchist methods. We leave this out of the 
discussion precisely because these methods belong to the 
more conventional management style. Two of the three 
solutions discussed here have been introduced on a wide 
scale and there is a lot of literature reviewing the 
experiences. The third, the voucher system is a new idea that 
has only just been introduced on a pilot basis but that is 
gaining momentum. At the outset it should also be made 
clear that these three strategies have multiple objectives and 
are not initiated solely to address the problems of teacher 
absenteeism. For example the strategy of creating a separate 
cadre of para-teachers also had the objective of reducing 
expenditure on teacher salaries. 
The Egalitarian Way: Decentralized Village Level 
Institutions 
 There are two ways through which local school 
management can take place. One is through the elected 
bodies that exist at the local level. Beginning from 1993, 
State governments are legally obliged to transfer many 
functions previously managed and monitored at the State 
level to local level elected bodies, the so-called Panchayati 
                                                
7We realise that there is an alternative interpretation that would regard the 
introduction of para-teachers as a sign of hope rather than as a sign of 
fatalism; after all, the idea is that this intervention would help to address the 
malaise. We classify it here as a fatalist response because the introduction of 
para-teachers on a large scale signifies a choice not to reform the existing 
human resources system within the Department of Education but to establish 
a parallel cadre. 
Raj Institutions (PRIs). Primary education is one of these 
activities that, according to this legislation, should be 
managed at the local level. The other way is through the 
creation of specific user group committees. These 
committees can exist at the level of the school (such as a 
school education committees - or SECs) or at the level of the 
village (such as a village education committee - or VECs). 
These committees have been stimulated by the Sarva 
Shiksha Abhiyan, which emphasizes the potentially large 
and positive role of these community institutions in school 
supervision, micro-planning, construction and maintenance, 
learning improvement activities and utilization of funds. 
 There are successful instances of both forms of 
decentralization. Madhya Pradesh is seen by many as a 
pioneer of decentralization. This State has relatively low 
levels of teacher absenteeism (17.6 per cent), which is 
understood by some as a positive effect of democratic 
decentralization (Mehrotra 2006) [3], (World Bank 2004) 
[26]. A similar positive effect of decentralization is reported 
from Karnataka (Drèze and Sen 2002) [27] (Ghosh 1992) 
[28]. The most acclaimed process of empowering Village 
Educational Committees was undertaken by the State of 
Nagaland. In response to teacher absenteeism, the 
government passed the ‘Communitisation of Nagaland 
Public Institutions and Services Act’ in 2002 (Rio 2005) [29] 
and granted significant powers to this body. An Impact 
Assessment carried out by UNICEF in 2004 revealed that 
teacher attendance improved to 90 per cent in 18 of the 28 
sample schools.
8
 
 These positive examples are, however, exceptional. The 
evidence from most other States is less encouraging. A 
sample survey of 14 States (covering all the regions of the 
country) to study the involvement of PRI bodies in primary 
education was carried out by the NGO PRIA in 2002. The 
findings revealed that in the majority of the States, PRI 
bodies are not authorized to initiate any disciplinary action 
against poorly performing teachers, even though they have 
been vested with the powers to supervise the attendance of 
teachers. The only right that they often have is the right to 
complain to the higher authorities. In many cases, members 
have become disillusioned with the PRI institutions since 
disciplinary action is rarely taken against erring teachers. As 
a result, the PRIs were found to play only a marginal role 
with respect to teacher management (PRIA 2002) [30]
9
. The 
PROBE team (1999) surveying four northern States found 
VECs on the whole to be token institutions without useful 
supervisory functions The Second Joint Review Mission of 
the SSA implicitly supports this by acknowledging the need 
for greater empowerment of community institutions for 
effectively monitoring the functioning of schools (MHRD 
GoI, 2006) [1]. 
 The observation that the link between decentralization 
and improved teacher performance in government schools is 
problematic (Bennell 2004) [31] seems to be true for the 
majority of the States. Effective functioning of local 
institutions is contingent upon the extent of powers and 
autonomy vested with them. In all States, critical functions 
                                                
8This has been endorsed by the GoI as a good model which could be 
adopted by other States (MHRD GoI, 2006) [1]. 
9Their role in infrastructure provisioning and maintenance was found to be 
comparatively larger. 
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in teacher management continue to rest with the State 
department. The local institutions may have come in to some 
extent, but they have never replaced the department 
(Pritchett and Pande 2006) [32]. Teachers are very well 
aware of the fact that the authority of the local bodies to 
punish them is limited (Duflo and Banerjee 2006) [16]. They 
have also actively opposed the decentralisation of teacher 
management functions to community level organisations 
(Vasavi 1997) [33]. In fact, as many observers have argued, 
the outright dismissive attitude of teachers towards 
‘egalitarian’ accountability relations is one of the important 
challenges to be tackled in order to make this an effective 
strategy (Vaidyanathan and Nair 2001) [34]. 
 Another major reason for the limited effectiveness of this 
strategy is the lack of awareness about the rights and powers 
bestowed upon PRIs or VECs/SECs. The PROBE restudy 
found numerous instances of committee members who were 
even unaware that they were listed as a committee member 
(Shiva Kumar 2009) [6]. PRI members in Haryana were 
hardly aware of the importance of the Annual Confidential 
Report (ACR) as a monitoring and supervision tool, though 
they are authorized to note their remarks in the ACR of 
teachers (PRIA 2002) [30]. In Kerala where the PRIs have 
been granted substantial powers, they demonstrate 
considerable involvement in infrastructure related aspects, 
but most of the activities related to teacher management 
(including hiring and firing of teachers) remain within the 
domain of the State government (Pritchett and Pande 2006) 
[32]. Even in the relatively successful State of Madhya 
Pradesh (MP), where the head of the village PRI body is 
mandated to sign the salary slip of the teacher as a mark of 
having verified his/her attendance, these heads often do so 
without having undertaken any kind of monitoring (Noronha 
2003) [35] (Sharma 1997) [36]. Capacity building of the 
functionaries is of crucial importance (Drèze 2000) [37]. 
Unfortunately, not enough is done in this regard. Even after 
four years of implementation of SSA, at least 12 States were 
indicted by the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of 
India for performing below par (in terms of coverage and 
quality) in imparting training to the VEC members in 2005-
06 (CAG Reports 2006) [38]. It may, however, also be the 
case that some of the VEC/SEC members themselves are not 
interested in undergoing such training. In many States the 
members are nominated by local politicians or they are 
elected along party lines. In such cases, the committees may 
serve as stepping stones for would-be politicians (or 
structures through which local politicians can enhance their 
influence) rather than tools of community control (Reddy 
and Bhavani forthcoming) [39] (Powis 2003) [40] (Rana 
2003) [41]. 
The Individualist Way: The School Voucher System 
 Unlike the other two strategies discussed above, the 
voucher system is not yet operational in the country, albeit it 
has been tried on a pilot basis
10
. This innovative idea is being 
pushed powerfully by the Centre for Civil Society (CCS), an 
independent non-profit research and educational organisation 
based in New Delhi. In January 2007, the CCS launched the 
so-called ‘School Choice Campaign’. The basic premise is 
that the disparity in the quality of schooling could be best 
                                                
10See www.ccs.in and www.schoolchoice.in. 
addressed by giving parents a real possibility to choose the 
school their children would attend. A voucher system would 
guarantee such choice. This system implies that rather than 
schools receiving the money directly, parents are subsidized 
through vouchers. This voucher may cover the full costs of 
education or only a part of it. Parents give the voucher to the 
school of their choice, and the school can reclaim the money 
from the institution that has handed out the voucher. This 
idea has caught the attention of some policy makers and 
finds a mention in the draft approach paper to the 11
th
 Five 
Year Plan for the period ranging from 2007 till 2012 
(Planning Commission GoI 2006) [42]. 
 The advocates of the voucher system base themselves on 
legal as well as pragmatic arguments. The legal argument is 
that Article 26(3) of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (1948) states that parents have the right to choose the 
kind of education they want for their children. Like in 
several other countries, in India also this right is violated 
since parental choice for many is restricted to poorly 
functioning government schools simply because private 
schools are unaffordable for them (Willmore 2004) [43]. The 
more pragmatic argument is that choice would result in 
government schools competing amongst themselves and 
government schools competing with private schools 
(Muralidharan 2006) [44]. This competition in turn would 
lead to quality improvement (Shah and Braun-Munzinger 
2006) [45]. The system would also enhance accountability 
since parents who pay with their vouchers will demand 
quality education; if they are dissatisfied they would take 
their voucher back and leave the school. Teacher 
absenteeism would come down since teachers would be 
constantly scrutinized by parents (Balasubramanian 2003) 
[46]. 
 Since the voucher system has only been piloted in India, 
there is not much evidence available about its effectiveness. 
So far as we know, there has been one evaluation of a 
voucher project which was implemented in New Delhi.
11
 In 
this pilot, the Centre for Civil Society awarded school 
vouchers worth up to Rs. 3600 Rs. per year to 408 students. 
The evaluation showed that the majority of the voucher 
beneficiaries (63 per cent) had made use of the possibility to 
exercise school choice, and had switched over from a 
government to a private school. On the whole, those who had 
received these vouchers were more satisfied than those who 
had not received such a voucher. It is unclear whether this 
voucher system only entailed a payment to the parents, or 
whether it also entailed a withdrawal of funds from the 
government schools. The evaluation also does not mention 
the effects of competition on school quality. 
 A voucher system only works if there are multiple 
suppliers. Hence, a relevant question is whether there are 
enough suppliers in rural areas to have real school choice. 
This may not be the case everywhere - although there is no 
doubt that the number of low fee private schools in rural 
areas is rapidly increasing. The ASER 2006 survey found 
that 18.6 per cent of all rural primary age children (7-10 
years) in the sample were attending private schools (Pratham 
                                                
11See ‘Evaluation of the Delhi Voucher Project. Summary’, downloadable 
from http://www.schoolchoice.in/events/20090219_ delhivvoucher_summ 
ary.php (accessed 6 March 2009) 
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2007) [47]. Eight States had more than 30 per cent of 
children in private schools at the primary level. In another 
study, it was found that 28 per cent of the villages in the 
sample had access to a government school as well as a 
private unaided primary school, though there was 
considerable inter-state variation (Muralidharan and Kremer 
2006) [48]. In all, these figures suggest that in the majority 
of the villages there is still only one provider - and a voucher 
system would hence not work. It is, however, not 
inconceivable that the introduction of a voucher system 
could somewhat change this scenario. It might well be that 
the system would stimulate private ‘edupreneurial’ activities. 
 Another crucial issue is related to quality assurance. 
About half of the village private schools observed by 
Muralidharan and Kremer (2006) [48] were unrecognised. 
They fall outside the regulatory system of the government, 
meaning that there is no government body responsible for 
quality control. Since a voucher system is likely to increase 
the number of unrecognised schools (in any case in the short 
run), the moot question then is how quality service delivery 
by these schools can be monitored and ensured. Some 
advocates of the voucher system have argued that this is not 
a problem; the voucher system would lead to competition 
and the laws of demand and supply would ensure that quality 
improves (Balasubramanian 2003) [46]. What kind of 
‘quality’ this intensified competition will lead to remains a 
question. As Majumdar and Mooij (forthcoming) [18] argue, 
there are different forms of competition in the private 
schooling sector: the ‘higher segment’ catering to the elite 
and middle classes compete by setting high standards (in 
terms of exam results). They restrict admission to children 
who will do well in their exams and who hail from well off 
families. The ‘lower’ segment, however wants to attract 
more children to their schools, and they compete by 
concentrating on the more visible dimensions of quality: 
colourful and freshly painted classrooms, continuous activity 
in the schools, claims of English-medium instruction, 
homework for the children (even when they are very young), 
etc. Shukla and Joshi (2008) [49] refer to these features as 
‘staging education’, rather than as expressions of real 
quality. It is very likely that the voucher system will enhance 
competition particularly in this lower segment, and that 
competition may therefore focus more on the visible signs of 
‘school activity’ rather than on dimensions of the teaching 
and learning process itself. Quality monitoring by a 
regulatory body would remain necessary (Levin 2002) [50], 
(Lauglo 1995) [51].
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 A third crucial issue is related to the political feasibility. 
The idea of vouchers goes directly against the interests of 
government school teachers, who are a powerful and well 
organised group (Indiresan 2006) [52]. This makes 
implementation on a large scale a highly unlikely 
proposition. 
                                                
12Majumdar and Mooij (forthcoming) [18] mention a second argument for a 
public regulatory body. If quality improvement depends exclusively on 
parents seeking the best opportunities for their children and the 
‘edupreneurial’ activities within an increasingly dominant private sector, 
what is lost is the possibility of a larger public debate about the educational 
goals one wishes to achieve as a community - a public vision about 
educational quality. 
The Fatalist Way: Creation of a Separate Cadre of Para-
Teachers 
 Unlike regular teachers in government schools who have 
permanent tenure, para-teachers are recruited on a fixed term 
contract. They receive a relatively low remuneration when 
compared to the regular teachers (Pandey 2006) [53]. In 
most States, local bodies play an important role in the 
selection of para-teachers (Fyfe 2007) [54] and in the 
majority of cases, the para-teachers are local residents 
(Govinda and Josephine 2004) [55]. Rather than the official 
two year teacher training programme that is mandatory for 
regular primary teachers, para-teachers have a much shorter 
pre-service training programme. Almost half a million para-
teachers were appointed in 2005-06 across 35 States, of 
which 93 per cent were working in rural areas and 66 per 
cent were posted in primary schools (NUEPA 2007) [56]. 
 Para-teachers can be hired for regular schools or for 
alternative schools (e.g. schools run by NGOs, schools set up 
by SSA or other programmes for specific groups, etc.). 
Initially the idea was that if para-teachers were recruited for 
regular schools, they would assist the regular teachers rather 
than teach themselves independently. In most cases, 
however, they function as normal teachers. The hiring of 
para-teachers in regular schools has an economic and a non-
economic rationale. The rising share of teacher salaries in 
educational expenditure combined with the increasing fiscal 
deficit faced by several State governments led to a freeze on 
the recruitment of regular teachers (Mehrotra and Buckland 
2001) [57]. Recruitment of para-teachers was visualized as a 
low cost solution since they are appointed on one-fourth to 
one-fifth of the regular salary (Kumar 2001) [58]. The non-
economic argument for hiring para-teachers in regular 
schools is that a locally recruited person would be more 
accountable to the local population, would be less absent and 
hence perform better. 
 If para-teachers are recruited as a part of the solution for 
teacher absenteeism, the question arises whether their 
absence rate is lower than that of regular teachers. The 
evidence is mixed. On the one hand, studies in Madhya 
Pradesh (Bose and Chatterjee 2004)[59] and Uttar Pradesh 
(SIEMAT-UP 2005 cited in World Bank 2006) [60] found 
para-teachers to be less absent. On the other hand, WBNAS 
observed that para-teachers and regular teachers had roughly 
the same absence rate of about 24 per cent (Kremer 2005) 
[5]. Moreover, there is some evidence suggesting that regular 
teachers’ absenteeism could increase after the appointment 
of para-teachers (Mehrotra and Buckland 2001) [57]. 
 It may be that the record of para-teachers in alternative 
schools is better than in regular schools - something that 
could be related to the fact that there is a higher level of 
community involvement in these schools than in regular 
schools leading to more effective accountability relation-
ships. A study conducted in West Bengal in 2002 showed 
that absenteeism among para-teachers in alternative schools 
was 43 per cent lower than that of teachers in regular 
primary schools (Pratichi Trust 2002) [61]. In a study on 
alternative schools in Madhya Pradesh it was found that 
though these schools were often functioning regularly 
(unlike many regular schools), the quality of education 
imparted by the para-teachers was problematically low 
(Leclercq 2002) [62]. Many scholars have observed that the 
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training of para-teachers is often insufficient. For example in 
Andhra Pradesh, though the para-teachers were supposed to 
be given training for 30 days before they start, it was found 
that in six districts the training ranged from only three to 
seven days (CAG Report 2006) [38]. Overall the amount and 
quality of academic support provided to para-teachers by the 
monitoring personnel is low on both quantity and quality 
(Govinda and Josephine 2004) [55]. 
 As mentioned already, para-teachers do not have a regular 
job, but have fixed term contracts (linked to the academic year). 
The argument of placing them on contract is that this would act 
as an incentive to perform better (Duthilleul 2005) [63]. Their 
commitment and lower absenteeism rates (when observed) can 
indeed perhaps be attributed to the impermanence of their 
contract, and it is believed that placing them on permanent 
contracts would make them indistinguishable from regular 
teachers (Mehrotra, 2004) [64]. In practice, however, there is 
hardly any framework for, or practice of, performance appraisal 
and most para-teachers get their contracts renewed (Duthilleul 
2005) [63]. Moreover, their lack of job security can also 
decrease motivation and lead to absenteeism, (Kremer 2004) 
[15]. The low wages can be perceived as unfair and may even 
force para-teachers to take up secondary employment (Bennell 
2004) [31] (Govinda and Josephine 2004) [55] (Leclercq 2002) 
[62] (Sharma 1999) [65]. 
 The creation of a separate cadre of para-teachers has led 
to a diversification of the primary teacher status 
(Göttelmann-Duret 2000) [66]. It has been argued that the 
creation of multiple layers of teachers with varying service 
conditions could have a demoralizing impact on the entire 
teaching force. It has been observed that the trend of 
recruiting para-teachers has led to ‘further degradation of the 
status of school teachers, thus diluting the identity of a 
teacher as a professional’ (NCTE 2006: 19) [67]. Teachers 
unions, on the whole, are against para-teachers and have 
demanded the abolition of the scheme. Concerns are also 
expressed about the demand from para-teachers to be 
integrated in the mainstream. This would defeat the very 
purpose of this low cost solution and might contribute to a 
further weakening of the teacher cadre (PROBE Team, 
1999). 
 In conclusion, there is little doubt that in some regular as 
well as alternative schools, the para-teachers have had some 
positive effects. There is evidence that in some cases, their 
absenteeism rate is less than that of regular teachers. As 
Drèze and Sen (2002) [27] have pointed out, it would 
therefore be unwise to completely dismiss this solution. Yet, 
on the other hand, in order for the scheme to work well, a 
more substantial investment would be needed for providing 
training and guidance (Mehrotra and Buckland 2001) [57]. 
The impact of para-teachers on the motivation and 
professional status of regular teachers also remains an 
important concern. It remains therefore unlikely that the 
hiring of para-teachers will turn out to be a simple fix for 
teacher absenteeism in the long run, even though it may be 
cost-efficient in the short run (Kremer 2004) [15] (Rogers 
2004) [68]. 
BY WAY OF CONCLUSION 
 We started the paper with a description of the four 
different styles of public management - the hierarchist, the 
egalitarian, the individualist and the fatalist approach - based 
on Hood’s cultural theory of public management. After a 
discussion of the implications of these styles for addressing 
the problem of teacher absenteeism, we zoomed in on three 
new policies and schemes that are meant - among other 
things - to address the problem of teacher absenteeism. 
Together with the more conventional solution (increasing 
monitoring and inspection) these constitute four alternative 
approaches, each fitting one of the management styles. We 
have shown that none of the solutions discussed has been 
really successful in addressing teacher absenteeism. It has 
become clear that, in order for the strategies to work well, 
certain preconditions have to be fulfilled. The creation of 
local level management bodies that would hold the teachers 
accountable (an egalitarian solution), for instance, requires 
that the members of these committees are sufficiently aware 
and empowered to stand up against poorly performing 
teachers. In other words, there should be a level playing 
field. The voucher system (a solution fitting the individualist 
style) requires that there are multiple suppliers and that there 
is a larger body that keeps checking on quality. In more 
general terms, competition should be ruly (Moore 2000) 
[69]. The recruitment of para-teachers (analysed here as an 
example of the fatalist approach) requires that the ad hoc 
remedy has a legitimacy and that it triggers the right kind of 
effects. Table 2 summarizes these preconditions of the 
various management styles and the extent to which these are 
realized in the case of addressing teacher absenteeism in 
India. 
 To conclude, there are three points we would like to 
stress. First, since the realization of these preconditions is 
essential for the strategies to work, they should receive much 
more serious attention. The fatalist approach is a bit different 
here - after all, it is based on the idea that there is a large 
degree of unpredictability anyhow - but for the other three it 
can be concluded that, in order to allow the strategies to have 
the desired effects, a lot of effort has to go into the 
realization of the preconditions. In fact, it makes no sense to 
introduce the strategies without concurrent efforts to change 
the social and institutional environment in the necessary 
direction. The hierarchist approach requires that the 
governance regime, or more specifically authority, is 
perceived as legitimate. This draws our attention to several 
dimensions of good governance, such as efficiency, rule of 
law, accountability, transparency and responsiveness. Given 
the extremely uneven level playing field that exists in much 
of India, any strategy based on the egalitarian management 
style should come with simultaneous initiatives to address 
the existing social and economic inequalities. In the case of 
local level management committees, this would mean serious 
investments in training and empowering committee members 
(often people who do not belong to socially dominant 
groups) to stand up against the poorly performing schools 
and teachers. An individualist approach requires real choice 
and also the establishment of a regulatory system. This 
means that the introduction of a voucher system should be 
accompanied by initiatives to realize these requirements. The 
fulfillment of these preconditions is certainly no guarantee of 
success, but without their (progressive) realization it is naive 
to expect the strategies can produce the desired results. 
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 Second, a combination of strategies could perhaps work 
better than relying on just one strategy. In fact, the most 
successful effort to address teacher absenteeism that we 
came across in our review involved a combination of the 
hierarchist approach (intensification of inspection through 
the use of cameras) and the individualist approach (income 
incentives and disincentives) (Duflo and Banerjee 2006) 
[16]. 
 Finally, all the management approaches imply strategies 
that ‘act on’ teachers rather than ‘act with’ them. It might 
well be that this is the Achilles’ heel of all approaches. They 
are all premised on the idea that teachers need to be 
disciplined by external forces. None of these approaches 
takes the problems, experiences and interpretations of the 
teachers themselves as the starting point. Based on our own 
fieldwork, we have come to realize that many teachers are 
very critical themselves about their behaviour, lack of 
commitment and absenteeism. Moreover, they have sensible 
things to say about the reasons that have made them less 
motivated (Mooij 2008) [9]. This made us realize that what 
is primarily needed is not a management approach that acts 
upon teachers, but one that regards teachers not only as part 
of the problem, but also as part of the solution - and thus as 
one of the essential actors to be involved in the formulation 
and implementation of any public management strategy. 
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